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INTRODUCTION 
Should possessors and manufacturers of child pornography be 
treated identically for purposes of victim compensation?  Various cir-
cuit courts of appeals say no.1  The Fifth Circuit, in Paroline II, took a 
different approach and said yes.2  In an en banc opinion, the Fifth 
Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 2259, the federal statute providing man-
datory restitution for victims of child exploitation and abuse, does 
not require a causal link between the possession of child pornogra-
phy and the resulting harm.  The Fifth Circuit’s holding now stands 
apart from all other circuits to have considered this question.  These 
circuits have interpreted § 2259(b)(3)(F)3—which explicitly requires 
causation—to modify the language of subparagraphs (A)–(E), thus 
importing a causation requirement into the entire statute.  The Unit-
ed States Supreme Court has granted certiorari and will soon consid-
er this question. 
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 1 See, e.g., United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1, 22–23 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 991–92 (7th Cir. 2012); In re Amy, 698 F.3d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 456–57 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 658–59 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 153–
54 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 756 (2011); United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1208–09 (11th Cir. 
2011). 
 2 In re Amy Unknown (Paroline II), 701 F.3d 749, 752 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom., 
Paroline v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013). 
 3 Subparagraph (F), the “catchall” provision, provides that the term “full amount of the 
victim’s losses” includes “any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of 
the offense.” 
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The authors believe that both interpretations are wrong.  The an-
swer lies somewhere in the middle and can be found in the Court’s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Specifically, based upon the theory 
of “aggregation” as enunciated in a long line of cases defining the 
scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, the Court has held 
that individual (or intrastate) activity, while not sufficient in itself to 
affect interstate commerce, is nonetheless subject to regulation based on its 
cumulative effect.4  The same argument applies in the context of 
child pornography, where the victim’s harm is connected to and in-
tertwined with the individual possession (and viewing) of sexually ex-
plicit images.  In the aggregate, possession of child pornography con-
tributes to the victim’s initial and continuing harm, and fuels an 
industry that exploits and abuses children.  Thus, while the Fifth Cir-
cuit reached the right result, it used the wrong reasoning.  The other 
circuit courts, however, unwisely require a relational nexus between 
the victim and the pornography possessor. 
The aggregation theory, which establishes a limited nexus be-
tween possession and ultimate harm, strikes the right balance be-
tween a possessor’s liberty interests and the victim’s right to compen-
sation for what is a unique—and continuing—harm.  Each act of 
pornography possession contributes independently and continuously 
to the victim’s harm by fueling the production of materials that ex-
ploit children.5  Put differently, since the harm suffered by victims of 
child pornography is sui generis, traditional rules of “but for” and 
proximate causation should not apply.  An aggregate harm approach 
is fair and constitutes sound public policy—the touchstone considera-
tions in proximate cause analysis.6 
 
 4 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 
(2005) (“[P]roduction of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or 
marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that 
commodity.”); United States v. Morales-de Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 16 (1st Cir. 2004) (“In addi-
tion to our own precedent applying Wickard’s principles to a child pornography statute in 
Robinson, the Supreme Court long ago recognized that child pornography is a commodity 
influenced by and subject to economic market forces.” (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 
103, 109–10 (1990) (“[I]t is ‘surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will de-
crease the production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess and view the 
product, thereby decreasing demand.’”))).  In Morales-de-Jesús, the First Circuit held that 
Congress had the authority, under the Commerce Clause, to penalize the local produc-
tion of pornography.  While factually distinguishable from Paroline II, Morales-de-Jesús sup-
ports the notion that individual possession has a direct impact upon production and 
thereby contributes to the victim’s harm.  372 F.3d at 16–17. 
 5 See, e.g., Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109–10; see also United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 98 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (“Proximate cause therefore exists on the aggregate level, and there is no rea-
son to find it lacking on the individual level.”). 
 6 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101–04 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting). 
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I.  THE FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY RESTITUTION STATUTE 
REQUIRES CAUSATION 
The federal child pornography restitution statute provides that 
restitution for the full amount of the victim’s losses is mandatory in 
all child pornography convictions, including convictions for pos-
sessing child pornography.7  Of particular note, the statute incorpo-
rates causation into its terms:  “the term ‘victim’ means the individual 
harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter.”8  
But the statute does not further define causation, presumably leaving 
to courts the definition of that word to apply.  That being said, there 
is no doubt that under the child pornography federal statutory 
scheme, the paramount quests are interdiction and elimination of 
child pornography, and full compensation for the victims.  Those 
twin quests can only be achieved through an aggregate proximate 
cause approach. 
 
 7 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2006):  Mandatory restitution. 
(a) In general.—Notwithstanding section 3663 or 3663A, and in addition to any other civ-
il or criminal penalty authorized by law, the court shall order restitution for any of-
fense under this chapter. 
(b) Scope and nature of order.— 
(1) Directions.—The order of restitution under this section shall direct the de-
fendant to pay the victim (through the appropriate court mechanism) the full 
amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the court pursuant to para-
graph (2). 
(2) Enforcement.—An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and 
enforced in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as an order under 
section 3663A. 
(3) Definition.—For purposes of this subsection, the term “full amount of the vic-
tim’s losses” includes any costs incurred by the victim for— 
     (A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care; 
     (B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation; 
     (C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses; 
     (D) lost income; 
     (E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and 
     (F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense. 
(4) Order mandatory.— 
     (A) The issuance of a restitution order under this section is mandatory. 
     (B) A court may not decline to issue an order under this section because of— 
     (i) the economic circumstances of the defendant; or 
     (ii) the fact that a victim has, or is entitled to, receive compensation for 
his or her injuries from the proceeds of insurance or any other source. 
(c) Definition.—For purposes of this section, the term “victim” means the individual 
harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter, including, in the 
case of a victim who is under 18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or de-
ceased, the legal guardian of the victim or representative of the victim’s estate, an-
other family member, or any other person appointed as suitable by the court, but 
in no event shall the defendant be named as such representative or guardian. 
 8 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c) (emphasis added). 
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II.  IN PAROLINE II, THE FIFTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE INTERPRETED 
§ 2259 TO REQUIRE A CAUSAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE POSSESSION OF 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE VICTIM’S HARM 
The Fifth Circuit, in Paroline II, reached the right result but erred 
in its reasoning.  In that case, petitioner Doyle Paroline, who pled 
guilty to possessing 150 to 300 images of the victim, argued that an 
award of restitution was not proper unless it could be shown that his 
possessory acts proximately caused Amy’s harm.9  The district court 
held that § 2259 required a showing of proximate cause, and denied 
restitution.10  In its view, Amy had failed to demonstrate that 
Paroline’s possession (and viewing) of her images proximately caused 
the ensuing harm.11 
In Paroline II, which was consolidated with a similar appeal, the 
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed.12  The court focused on the 
language of § 2259(b)(3)(A)–(E), which listed five categories for 
which restitution could be awarded.13  Subparagraph (F), the 
“catchall” provision, authorized restitution for “any other losses suf-
fered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense.”14  Paroline ar-
gued that subparagraph (F)’s proximate cause language should be 
interpreted to modify and therefore import into subparagraphs (A)–
(E) a proximate cause requirement. 
The Fifth Circuit disagreed.  Applying the “rule of the last ante-
cedent” canon of statutory construction, the court held that causation 
was only required for losses under subparagraph (F).15  The court ex-
plained that “the grammatical structure of § 2259(b)(3) reflects the 
intent to read each category of loss separate from the one that pre-
ceded it and limit the application of the ‘proximate result’ language 
in § 2259(b)(3)(F).”16  Such an interpretation was based upon the 
statute’s plain language and consistent with its “broad restitutionary 
 
 9 Paroline II, 701 F.3d at 752–53.  The Fifth Circuit confronted the same issue in United 
States v. Wright, 639 F.3d 679, 683–85 (5th Cir. 2011), where it applied the holding in In re 
Amy Unknown (Paroline I), 636 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2011), and held that restitution under 
§ 2259 did not require causation.  In Paroline II, both Wright’s and Amy’s appeal (from a 
district court order denying restitution) were heard together en banc. 
 10 United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 791 (E.D. Tex. 2009). 
 11 Id. at 793. 
 12 In In re Amy, the Fifth Circuit denied restitution because it was unclear whether § 2259 
required a showing of proximate cause.  591 F.3d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 13 Paroline II, 701 F.3d at 760. 
 14 Id. (emphasis added). 
 15 Id. at 765. 
 16 Id. 
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purpose,”17 which directs the “defendant to pay the victim . . . the full 
amount of the victim’s losses.”18 
The Fifth Circuit reached the right result, but through reasoning 
that leads to unjust consequences.19  The Fifth Circuit’s majority deci-
sion in Paroline II, in awarding restitution to the victim without any 
proximate cause requirement (1) is at odds with other circuits that 
have interpreted § 2259(b)(3)(F); (2) threatens to disrupt the ad-
ministration of unrelated federal statutes, which have applied the “se-
ries modifier” to similar “catchall” provisions; and (3) may impermis-
sibly expand the transferred intent doctrine.  In short, the court 
applied the wrong canon of statutory construction.  It should have 
held that causation was required under each subparagraph—and 
used a non-traditional formulation to find that it was satisfied. 
The First Circuit, in United States v. Kearney,20 however, got it right.  
The court recognized that, for purposes of restitution under § 2259, 
causation should be predicated on aggregation.21  To hold otherwise 
would allow an entire class of individuals to escape liability for con-
duct that violates a child’s personhood and perpetuates the wide-
spread victimization of children.22  This result contravenes the express 
intent underlying 18 U.S.C. § 2259, which requires full restitution for 
“any offense” under Title 18, including possession.23  This was the 
correct—and fair—result.  Below is a detailed discussion of how—and 
why—the Supreme Court should adopt the aggregation theory. 
III.  POSSESSORS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY—INDIVIDUALLY AND 
COLLECTIVELY—CAUSE HARM TO THE VICTIM 
Proximate cause must be considered within the context of Con-
gress’s intent when enacting § 2259, which expressly addressed the 
harms caused by both the producers and the possessors of child por-
nography.24 
 
 17 Id. at 760. 
 18 Id. (quoting § 2259(b)(1)). 
 19 Importantly, “[a]n apportionment system that spreads the effect of the penal goals of de-
terrence, retribution, and rehabilitation among the many convicted consumers of child 
pornography, while leading ultimately to the goal of full compensation for caused injury, 
fulfills the public purposes of restitution . . . .”  United States v. Gamble, 709 F.3d 541, 
553 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). 
 20 672 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 21 Id. at 98. 
 22 See United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (W.D. Pa. 2010). 
 23 Section 2259(a) provides that a district court “shall order restitution for any offense un-
der this chapter.” 
 24 See United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 97 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The restitution statute was 
enacted against a body of Supreme Court case law explaining the type of harm caused by 
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A. Possessors of Child Pornography Individually and Collectively Contribute 
to the Victim’s Harm 
In United States v. Hardy, a federal district court noted, 
Children are exploited, molested, and raped for the prurient pleasure of 
[defendant] and others who support suppliers of child pornography.  
These small victims may rank as ‘no one else’ in [defendant’s] mind, but 
they do indeed exist . . . . Their injuries and the taking of their innocence 
are all too real.  There is nothing ‘casual’ or theoretical about the scars 
they will bear from being abused for [defendant’s] advantage. 
. . . .  
. . . The simple fact that the images have been disseminated perpetuates 
the abuse initiated by the producer of the materials.  Consumers such as 
[defendant] who ‘merely’ or ‘passively’ receive or possess child pornog-
raphy directly contribute to this continuing victimization.  Having paid 
others to ‘act out’ for him, the victims are no less damaged for his having 
remained safely at home . . . .25 
Obviously, the federal district court in Hardy saw that causation 
could easily be tracked to the user or “mere possessor” of the materi-
al.  And the First Circuit’s approach properly balances the severity of 
an individual’s conduct with the aggregate effects of possession.26  
Proximate cause exists on an “aggregate level,” even when “the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff might be the same if one of the numerous 
tortfeasors had not committed the tort.”27 
In Kearney, the defendant, who was convicted of transportation, 
possession, and distribution of child pornography, argued that “be-
cause so many have seen and distributed the pornography, his con-
tribution cannot be said to have caused any harm absent specific 
linkage to [the victim’s] knowledge about him.”28  The First Circuit 
rejected this argument: 
[I]t is true that [the expert report] does not state that any single addi-
tional instance of possession or distribution by itself increases the harm 
to [the victim].  But although such an explanation would be sufficient for a 
finding of causation, it is not necessary for such a finding.  Kearney’s con-
duct contributed to a state of affairs in which [the victim]’s emotional harm 
was worse than would have otherwise been the case.  Proximate cause ex-
ists where the tortious conduct of multiple actors has combined to bring 
 
distribution and possession of child pornography . . . . These cases make clear that injury 
to the child depicted in the child pornography . . . is a readily foreseeable result of distri-
bution and possession of child pornography.” (emphasis added)). 
 25 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United States 
v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 259 (3d. Cir. 2007)). 
 26 Kearney, 672 F.3d at 98; see also Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 
(1992). 
 27 Kearney, 672 F.3d at 98. 
 28 Id. 
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about harm, even if the harm suffered by the plaintiff might be the same 
if one of the numerous tortfeasors had not committed the tort.29 
Indeed, “causation exists even where ‘none of the alternative causes is 
sufficient by itself, but together they are sufficient’ to cause the 
harm.”30 
As such, the Kearney court held that restitution under § 2259 was 
not precluded simply because the victim “would have suffered harm 
in the absence of [defendant’s] conduct.”31  The court also rejected 
the notion that “the victim of child pornography could only show 
causation if she focused on a specific defendant’s viewing and redis-
tribution of her images and then attributed specific losses to that de-
fendant’s actions.”32  As the majority recognized, “[t]he ‘logic’ of this 
argument is that there would be no remedy for the harm suf-
fered . . . as a result of the redistribution and possession,” thus allow-
ing each defendant “to escape liability for a reason that, if recog-
nized, would likewise protect each other defendant in the group.”33 
Finding causation in this context is not tantamount to strict liabil-
ity; it reflects the notion that the intentional possession of child por-
nography is directly related to the resultant harm.34  The aggregate 
harm principle is also consonant with principles of fairness and 
 
 29 Id. (emphasis added).  The Kearney court claimed that its analysis was not a departure 
from traditional proximate cause principles in that it was foreseeable, by possessing child 
pornography, that the children depicted in the images would be harmed.  The finding 
that causation existed on an “aggregate level” is less commonly invoked to justify a find-
ing of “but for” proximate cause. 
 30 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM §§ 27 reporters’ n. cmt. g, 36 cmt. a (2010) (“[E]ven an insufficient condi-
tion . . . can be a factual cause of harm when it combines with other acts to constitute a 
sufficient set to cause the harm. . . .”)); see also United States v. Veazie, No. 2:11-cr-202-
GZS, 2012 WL 1430540, at *3 n.4 (D. Me. Apr. 25, 2012) (“[P]roximate cause exists 
where the tortuous conduct of multiple actors has combined to bring about harm, even if 
the harm suffered by the plaintiff might be the same if one of the numerous tortfeasors 
had not committed the tort.” (quoting Kearney, 672 F.3d at 98)). 
 31 Id. at 99. 
 32 Id. (declaring that restitution is not precluded simply “because [defendant’s] contribu-
tion to the harm cannot be precisely ascertained with exactitude”). 
 33 Id.; see also United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the 
defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in the victim’s harm, despite the fact that 
the victim “suffered from pre-exiting, untreated psychological problems prior to” meeting 
the defendant). 
 34 See United States v. Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792 (D.N.D. 2010) (“The recipient of 
child pornography obviously perpetuates the existence of the images received, and there-
fore the recipient may be considered to be invading the privacy of the children depicted, 
directly victimizing these children.” (quoting United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930 
(5th Cir. 1998))). 
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sound public policy, which counsel against a mechanical application 
of the “but for” causation test.35 
Of course, there must be “some direct relation between the injury 
asserted and the injurious conduct,” and not just “harm flowing 
merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the de-
fendant’s acts.”36  The causal connection, however, between even a 
single viewing of child pornography and the resultant harm is readily 
apparent.37  In the aggregate, possession and distribution bear far 
more than “some direct relation”; they are the sine qua non for the 
initial and continuing harm that each victim suffers.  To argue oth-
erwise “defies both fact and law.”38 
Aggregation is neither a novel nor an unworkable concept.  In the 
Commerce Clause context, aggregation has—for nearly three-
quarters of a century—been the basis upon which the Supreme Court 
connected purely intrastate activities to its effects on interstate com-
merce.39  In Wickard, the Court held that a local farmer’s modest pro-
duction of wheat, for purely intrastate purposes and self-
consumption, nonetheless had an aggregate effect of interstate 
commerce.40 
While an effect is not by implication a cause, it undoubtedly “con-
tribute[s] to a state of affairs in which [the victim’s] emotional harm 
was worse than would have otherwise been the case.”41  This is true, a 
 
 35 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Tallent, 872 F. Supp. 2d 679, 686 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (“[P]roximate 
cause essentially serves as a proxy for fairness. . . . [C]ourts should limit liability on public 
policy grounds where holding the defendant liable would be unfair or unjust.”); see also 
Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (“Here we use ‘proximate 
cause’ to label generically the judicial tools used to limit a person’s responsibility . . . .  At 
bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects ‘ideas of what justice demands, or of what 
is administratively possible and convenient.’” (quoting W. KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984))). 
 36 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. 
 37 See Kearney, 672 F.3d at 95 (“Every instance of viewing images of child pornography repre-
sents a renewed violation of the privacy of the victims and a repetition of their abuse.” 
(quoting Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 
§ 501(2)(D), 120 Stat. 587, 624)). 
 38 Kearney, 672 F.3d at 94. 
 39 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942); see also United States v. Morales-de Jesús, 
372 F.3d 6, 16 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the aggre-
gation principle of Wickard while limiting its application to statutes regulating commercial 
or economic activities). 
 40 317 U.S. at 127–28 (“That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may be 
trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, 
as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far 
from trivial.”). 
 41 United States v. Tallent, 872 F. Supp. 2d 679, 688 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (quoting Kearney, 
672 F.3d at 98). 
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fortiori, because the possession of child pornography contributes to a 
continuing harm.42 
B. Traditional Proximate Cause Analysis Does Not Account for the Harm 
Caused By the Individual Possessors of Child Pornography 
Adhering to the traditional “but for” and foreseeability tests would 
involve the courts in an unworkable parsing of conduct that is often 
indivisible, and does not reflect the relationship between posses-
sion—by any individual—and the underlying harm.43 
Requiring a direct connection between possession and the victim’s 
actual losses, or notification to the victim of the specific defendant(s) 
who viewed such images,44 misperceives the harm that child pornog-
raphy victims suffer.45  The harm does not lie in knowing who viewed 
the images, but in knowing that they were viewed at all.46  Knowing 
 
 42 Kearney, 672 F.3d at 94–95; see also Morales-de Jesús, 372 F.3d at 16. (“[P]ossessing child 
pornography fuels the demand side of the market . . . .”). 
 43 Several circuit courts support a traditional application of proximate cause.  The D.C. Cir-
cuit based its finding of a proximate cause requirement on “traditional principles of tort 
and criminal law, and on § 2259(c)’s definition of ‘victim’ as an individual harmed ‘as a 
result’ of the defendant’s offense.”  United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 658 (6th Cir. 
2012) (quoting United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).  As the D.C. 
Circuit emphasized, “[i]t is a bedrock rule of both tort and criminal law that a defendant 
is only liable for harms he proximately caused.”  Evers, 669 F.3d at 658 (quoting Monzel, 
641 F.3d at 535–36) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Without such requirement, “li-
ability would attach to all sorts of injuries a defendant might indirectly cause, no matter 
how ‘remote’ or tenuous the causal connection.”  Evers, 669 F.3d at 658 (quoting Monzel, 
641 F.3d at 537) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Put differently, “[a] general causa-
tion requirement without a subsidiary proximate causation requirement is hardly a re-
quirement at all, because [s]o long as the victim’s injury would not have occurred but for 
the defendant’s offense, the defendant would be liable for the injury’”  Evers, 669 F.3d at 
659 (alteration in original) (quoting Monzel, 641 F.3d at 537 n.8) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  As the Evers court held, “[h]ad Congress meant to abrogate the tradi-
tional requirement for everything but the catch-all, surely it would have found a clearer 
way of doing so.” Evers, 669 F.3d at 658–59 (quoting Monzel, 641 F.3d at 536–37).  See also 
Brief for Professors Adam Lamparello and Charles MacLean as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party, Paroline v. United States, (filed Nov. 19, 2013) (No. 12-8561), 2013 WL 
6235571 (“such an approach would ‘erect an ‘impossible burden’ on the victims’ statuto-
ry right to restitution and frustrate the express purpose of § 2259[”]) (citing Brief for Re-
spondent at 26). 
 44 See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1263 (9th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that 
causation is satisfied where the victim knows the identity of those who have viewed her 
images). 
 45 See United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[F]or proximate 
cause to exist, there must be a causal connection between the actions of the end-user and 
the harm suffered by the victim.”). 
 46 United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“[The original victim]’s 
appearance in images held by Defendant make her an ‘individual harmed as a result of a 
commission of a crime’ under § 2259, and therefore a victim for purposes of ordering 
restitution under § 2259.” (emphasis added)). 
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that these images exist and are available for public consumption 
causes the emotional and psychological damage that § 2259 is in-
tended to address. 
This fact dispels any notion that possession of child pornography 
is a victimless crime.  As the court in Kearney held, 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, for thirty years, that indi-
viduals depicted in child pornography are harmed by the continuing dis-
semination and possession of such pornography containing their image.  
Such materials are “a permanent record of the children’s participation 
and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circula-
tion.” . . . Indeed, the Court has stated that “as a permanent record of a 
child’s abuse, the continued circulation itself would harm the child who 
had participated.  Like a defamatory statement, each new publication of the 
speech would cause new injury to the child’s reputation and emotional well-
being.”47 
That is precisely why “aggregate level” causation is justified.48 
This is not to suggest that anyone convicted of possession will face 
“infinite liability, or be responsible for harms that occur prior to the 
crime’s commission.”49  Conduct that might not otherwise be causally 
related to the victim’s harm, however, can become so when, together 
with the conduct of others, it contributes to “repetition of [the vic-
tim’s] abuse.”50  Possession causes harm because the lifeblood of pro-
duction is individual consumption. 
C. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Paroline I Disregarded the “Series 
Modifier” and Leads to Unjust Results 
1. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision Has the Potential to Disrupt the Orderly 
Administration and Interpretation of Unrelated Federal Restitution 
Provisions 
The Fifth Circuit erred when holding that § 2259(b)(3)(A)–(E) 
did not require proximate cause.  The majority’s opinion relied on 
the rule of the last antecedent to hold that § 2259(b)(3) “limit[ed] 
the phrase ‘suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense’ 
 
 47 Kearney, 672 F.3d at 94 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982); Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002)). 
 48 Kearney, 672 F.3d at 98. 
 49 Brief for Professors Adam Lamparello and Charles MacLean as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party, supra note 43, at 14–15; see also United States v. Ageloff, 809 F. Supp. 2d 89, 
104 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[Restitution requires] reasonable estimates arrived at by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.”). 
 50 Kearney, 672 F.3d at 95 (quoting Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501(2)(D), 120 Stat. 587, 624). 
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in § 2259(b)(3)(F) to the miscellaneous ‘other losses’ contained in 
that subsection.”51 
In so doing, the Fifth Circuit disregarded the “series modifier” 
canon, which would have incorporated the proximate cause require-
ment for all subparagraphs § 2259(b)(3)(A–E)).52  The Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation is inconsistent with other circuits that have interpreted 
§ 2259(b)(3)(F), as well as unrelated federal statutes.53  Accepting the 
Fifth Circuit’s rationale, therefore, has the potential to create dis-
harmony in the administration of various federal criminal restitution 
statutes. 
2. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision Threatens to Impermissibly Transfer 
Scienter 
When enacting § 2259, “Congress made no distinction between 
the various actors involved in the production, distribution, receipt 
and possession of child pornography, notwithstanding the strong 
possibility the culpability of these actors varies.”54  Importantly, given 
that the lesser-included offense of possessing child pornography is 
inextricably linked with the harm resulting from its manufacture and 
distribution, it is just to subject both possessors and manufacturers to 
restitution. 
 
 51 Paroline II, 701 F.3d at 762; see also United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1, 20 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(providing that the rule of last antecedent states that a limiting phrase “should ordinarily 
be read as modifying only the noun or phrase it immediately follows” (quoting Barnhart 
v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003))). 
 52 Analogous federal statutes support the conclusion that application of the “series modifi-
er” would have been consistent with Congress’s intent when enacting § 2259.  See, e.g., 
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248; Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 
1907–10; and Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (incorporating the criminal restitution statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(a)(2), 
3663A(a)(2), and 3771(e), which define the term “victim” as “a person directly and prox-
imately harmed” by conduct that justified an award of restitution). 
 53 See, e.g., United States v. Fast, 709 F.3d 712, 721 (8th Cir. 2013).  In Fast, the Eighth Cir-
cuit considered whether the fact that § 2259(b)(3)(A)–(E), which, unlike 
§ 2264(b)(3)(A)–(E), enumerated specific categories of losses, meant that subparagraphs 
(A)–(E) of § 2259 (b)(3) did not require proximate cause.  The Eighth Circuit answered 
this question in the negative, holding that “the variation among these restitution statutes 
d[oes] not mean that Congress eliminated the proximate cause requirement for the spe-
cifically enumerated losses in subsections 2259(b)(3)(A) through (E).”  Id.  See also Unit-
ed States v. Hayes, 135 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying the series modifier to hold 
that the proximate cause language in § 2264(b)(3)(F), which authorized restitution for 
interstate domestic violence, 18 U.S.C. § 2261; interstate stalking, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A; and 
interstate violation of protection orders, 18 U.S.C. § 2262, applied to subparagraphs (A)–
(E)). 
 54 United States v. Tallent, 872 F. Supp. 2d 679, 682 (E.D. Tenn. 2012). 
48 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY [Vol. 16: 
In other contexts, however, such a result would be unjust and con-
trary to law.55  For example, there are significant differences between 
interstate domestic violence and interstate violation of a protective 
order.56  If the Fifth Circuit’s decision were followed in contexts other 
than child pornography, crimes of varying culpability would, in effect, 
be construed as causing the same harm and subject different defend-
ants to the same restitution statute.57 
Such an interpretation would, de facto, transfer the scienter of a 
defendant who committed a more serious crime to the defendant 
who committed a lesser—and often dissimilar—crime.  Such an ap-
proach violates the well-established limits on transferred intent.58 
The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, therefore, threatens to under-
mine the administration of criminal restitution statutes and to col-
lapse crimes of different severity into a single remedial category.  If 
Congress wished to effectuate such a result, it would likely have been 
more explicit.  Congress certainly would not have included the words 
“proximately caused” in subparagraph (F), when the courts have used 
the series modifier canon to apply it equally to all preceding sec-
tions.59 
Ultimately, the approach adopted in Kearney reflects the unique 
harm that child pornography victims face and recognizes that posses-
sion of child pornography contributes to an aggregate harm, thus 
making possession a direct and proximate cause of that harm. 
 
 55 With respect to culpability, the differences between possession and production are evi-
denced by the penalties imposed under federal law.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), defend-
ants convicted of producing child pornography face a minimum sentence of fifteen years 
and a maximum of thirty, per 18 U.S.C. § 2252(e).  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(4)(B), however, defendants only convicted of possession face a maximum term 
of ten years. 
 56 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261–62. 
 57 Of course, courts have the discretion to apportion a restitution award based on the par-
ticular circumstances of a case.  The fact remains, however, that individuals convicted of 
different crimes would potentially face the same restitution award.  This goes against the 
basic notion in criminal law that criminal sanctions vary depending on the severity of the 
crimes. 
 58 United States v. Pulungan, 569 F.3d 326, 330–31 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]ransferring intent 
from one genus of offense to another has never been permitted.”). 
 59 See, e.g., United States v. Gamble, 709 F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting, in the con-
text of § 2259, that “Congress [is] presumed to have legislated against the backdrop of 
our traditional legal concepts which render [proximate cause] a critical factor, and ab-
sence of contrary direction here [is] taken as satisfaction [of] widely accepted definitions, 
not as a departure from them” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
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CONCLUSION 
Paroline represents a clash between victims’ rights and the protec-
tions that should be afforded to criminal defendants.  Victims of child 
pornography suffer the type of harm that cannot be overstated, and it 
results from despicable acts of abuse and exploitation. Importantly, 
however, possessors of child pornography are arguably less culpable 
than manufacturers and should be penalized differently.  Ordinarily, 
this argument would have substantial merit—subjecting different cat-
egories of offenses to the same potential penalty could affront due 
process of law and raise Eighth Amendment proportionality con-
cerns. 
The child pornography context, however, is unique.  The inter-
dependent relationship between possessors and manufacturers of 
child pornography contributes to a life-altering, aggregate harm to 
young children, thereby justifying a restitutionary award that would 
otherwise be hard to apportion.  The correct approach, however, is 
not to dispense with causation altogether, or to adopt the traditional 
rules of proximate causation.  An aggregation approach properly bal-
ances the defendant’s due process guarantees with the victim’s inter-
est in full restitution, thus achieving the goals that § 2259 sought to 
achieve. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
